This course, The Problem of the World, delved into the basics of Kantian metaphysics by asking, what exactly is the problem with referencing the 'world'? Philosophers often refer to the 'world' when discussing issues of metaphysics. Do our theories represent what the world is really like - the actual reality of the world instead of whatever surface impressions we receive. This leads to a big divide within philosophy. To oversimplify, transcendental realists believe there is some fundamental world we are representing, and transcendental idealists believe that we have no proof or access to any underlying reality - we cannot step outside of our senses to see if there's anything else. Kant in particular spent much of his career on this issue - the empirically accessible world versus the world-as-it-is-in-itself (the 'fundamental world' that realists believe in). This course focused on Kant's theories, contrasting them with Kripke's theories of reference and applying them to issues within philosophy of science and measurement.